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Abstract
This paper considers firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when de-
mand is uncertain and correlated. Before demand is realized, two firms decide to invest
in their local capacity. Provider(s) of flexible resource observe these decisions and invest
in their capacity. After demand is realized, firms buy flexible resource if demand exceeds
their local capacity. I find that market power of the monopolist providing flexible re-
sources distorts investment incentives, while competition mitigates them. The extent of
improvement depends critically on demand correlation and the cost of capacity: under
social optimum and monopoly, if the flexible resource is cheap, the relationship between
investment and correlation is positive, and if it is costly, the relationship becomes neg-
ative; under duopoly, the relationship is positive. The analysis also sheds light on some
policy discussions in markets such as cloud computing.
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1 Introduction
For firms in various industries, capacity investment decision involves investing early in their
own capacity before demand for their products is realized, and such investment is difficult to
reverse. After the demand is realized, firms have the option to undertake a second investment
in a flexible resource to accommodate the excess demand, for instance by outsourcing. In the
IT sector, cloud computing provides such an opportunity for outsourcing. Cloud computing is
fundamentally the leasing of computer services, including computing power and storage, but
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on an unprecedented scale. While local computing capacity can support the average demand of
the firm, cloud computing is able to scale services on demand and accommodate the workload
that exceeds what the local capacity can handle.1 Accordingly, firms can use cloud computing
as a flexible resource for business continuity and disaster recovery plans.2
Moreover, in the cloud computing market, computing demand is uncertain as demand varies
daily; and correlated at a global level. For example, a U.S. cloud provider such as Amazon,
Google and Microsoft could have customers from Europe as well as Australia. Correlation is
therefore driven to some extent by geography: computing demands from countries that are close
to each other are positively correlated; demands from countries that are located in different
time zones are negatively correlated. Moreover, as argued by Harms and Yamartino (2010),
even the largest cloud provider will not be able to eliminate uncertainty and correlation.3
This paper focuses on the problem of capacity investment in two resources when demand is
uncertain and correlated. In the cloud computing example, capacity is a key part of competition
in this industry. In the introductory phase, it is common that cloud providers build far more
capacity than needed, and one does not expect capacity to be an issue in this growing phase.
However, as cloud computing enters a more mature phase, capacity may become constrained
as demand grows quickly.45 For example, on August 25, 2013, Amazon seems to struggle to
keep up with the growing computing demand, and an IT problem at one of its datacenters
has caused many users of major web services such as Instagram, Netflix, Vine and Airbnb to
experience lengthy delays and reduced data transfer speeds for several hours.6 Amazon’s web
stores, Microsoft’s outlook.com, Google’s Gmail email service and the YouTube video site have
also faced similar glitches from time to time. This raises a number of interesting questions:
what is the profit-maximizing investment strategy in flexible resource such that the problem
of quality degradation can be avoided? How should we promote efficient investment from a
public policy perspective?
The contribution of this paper is twofold: first, I consider investment in two resources:
firms first invest in their local capacity, and later can use flexible resources as an alternative
sourcing option to cover temporary shortage of local resources; Second, I focus on uncertain
and correlated demand; whereas the existing literature either assumes one type of resources
1The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology provides five defining characteristics of cloud
computing: on-demand service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity and measured service.
This paper focuses on the definition of on-demand service and rapid elasticity.
2Business continuity and disaster recovery plans minimize any disruption of business operation due to
insufficient local capacity or failure of critical systems.
3In the cloud computing market, retailers increase computing demand during the holiday season; and busi-
nesses need more computing power during the tax season. However, this type of correlation is not correlation
across firms, and is therefore not the focus of this paper.
4International Data Corporation (IDC) estimates that worldwide spending on public cloud services is ex-
pected to reach $47.4 billion in 2013 and $107 billion in 2017, which represents a growth rate five times that of
the IT industry as a whole.
5Capacity can be interpreted in two ways: number of physical servers or service quality. In the former case,
there is a maximum traffic that each server can handle. In the latter case, even if the capacity does not hit the
limit, high demands can put a costly strain on servers, which results in poor quality of service.
6BBC news, “Instagram, Vine and Netflix hit by Amazon glitch,” available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/technology-23839901, August 26, 2013 (accessed on August 27, 2013).
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or ignores demand correlation. An interesting finding is that investment can increase with
correlation, which is in contrast to the common belief that only negative correlations are
valuable because the provider can aggregate demand and reduces the risk.7 The reason why
providers invest more as correlation increases is that when capacity is cheap, providers can
benefit more from high demand realizations without worrying about the risk of low demand
realizations.
Two firms, whose demand is uncertain and correlated, make their investment decision
in local resource under demand uncertainty. Observing firms’ local investment, providers of
flexible resource (e.g. Amazon, Google and Microsoft) decide how much to invest in capacity,
and set the price for their flexible resource (e.g. Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Compute
Engine, Microsoft Azure). After demand is realized, firms can buy flexible resources if demand
exceeds their local capacity.
I consider both cases of monopoly and duopoly in providing the flexible resource. As should
be expected, investment is suboptimal in the monopoly market. Particularly, the provider of
the flexible resource tends to underinvest in its capacity with respect to the socially optimal
level, whereas firms tend to overinvest in their local capacity. Such inefficiency comes from
market power of the monopolist. Firms invest in local capacity to avoid being exploited by the
monopolist, which in turn reduces investment incentive of the monopolist.
Competition always mitigates the underinvestment problem, but more interestingly, the
extent of improvement depends crucially on demand correlation and the cost of capacity. Both
socially optimal and monopoly investment in flexible resource increases with correlation if
the investment cost of flexible resource is small enough, and decreases with correlation if the
flexible resource is costly. The reason is that as correlation increases, firms either “win big”
when demand realization is high for both firms or “lose big” when demand realizations is low
for both firms. If the flexible resource is cheap, the planner or the provider need not worry
about “losing”. Rather, they will focus on reaping benefits from the “winning” outcome, and
therefore they invest more as correlation increases. On the contrary, if the flexible resource is
expensive, then “losing” is costly, and thus they invest less as correlation increases.
Under duopoly, I show that investment in flexible resource is increasing in correlation for
high or low correlations with a numerical example. The reason for not observing the negative
relationship between investment and correlation in this case, as opposed to the social optimum
and the monopoly case, is that firms rely more on the flexible resource as competition between
providers lowers the price of flexible resources. Firms’ incentive to capture the windfall from the
“winning” high demand realizations increasingly outweighs their incentive to avoid the risk of
“losing” as correlation increases. Knowing this, each provider is willing to build a bigger capac-
ity of flexible resources. These results suggest that information on the cost condition and the
degree of demand correlation have important consequences for investment. They also explain
the need for far more data on costs and demand in order to underpin the appropriate degree
of competition in an industry. I will discuss in more detail the implications of competition on
investment in the cloud computing industry in the penultimate section.
7See, for instance, p. 218 of Bayrak et al. (2011).
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1.1 Literature
This paper is closely related to the literature on capacity and resource flexibility in operational
management. However, unlike this paper, this literature either studies monopolistic models
that cannot explain the effect of competition or studies a competitive setting without demand
correlation. For example, Lee (2009) studies the optimal capacity investment of a computing
service provider in a single resource in the absence of correlated demands. Niyato, Chaisiri and
Lee (2009) study the optimal choice of private and public computing service in the monopoly
and oligopoly market, but again in a context without correlated demands. Both Van Miegham
(1998), and Bish and Wang (2004) study the optimal investment strategy in flexible resources
when a monopolist faces uncertain demands for its two products, which corresponds to the
social optimum in this model. However, they did not identify the problem of suboptimal
investment, and more importantly, how to correct the problem. There are few papers that
study firms’ choice of technology in a competitive setting. See, for instance, Goyal and Netessine
(2007) and Anupindi and Jiang (2008). However, these papers focus on the production stage,
without taking into account the incentives to provide flexible resource.
This paper is also related to the literature on Real Options (RO) in finance, which focuses
on the role of RO in providing flexibility to management decisions. However, unlike financial
assets, IT investments are not tradable, and therefore cannot be priced at the value of risk;
rather they are priced by a third party, which is the service provider in this case. See, for
instance, Angelou and Economides (2005), Benaroch and Kauffman (1999) and Kauffman et.
al. (2002) for details on the limitation of RO’s applicability in IT investments. Moreover, the
RO literature usually assumes that the value of investment projects is uncorrelated, whereas
demand correlation plays an important role here.
2 The Model
Consider two firms, 1 and 2, that need to build capacity in order to serve their customers. To
do this, they can either invest in their own local resource L or they can buy flexible resources K
from the market. The difference lies in that investments in local resources are irreversible and
these resources are for the exclusive use of the investing firm, while flexible resources can be
bought from the market instantly when needed and released when not needed. An example of
flexible resources is cloud computing as cloud computing power is provisioned as an on-demand
service. The firm gets a profit pi for each consumer served.
Investment technology. The unit cost of local resource and flexible resource are denoted by
cL and cK respectively. I assume that local resource is supplied competitively, so that firms
can buy L at a price cL. The flexible resource market can be either a monopoly or a duopoly.
Demand. The demand for the final services of the two firms is uncertain and correlated.
More specifically, demands for firm 1 and 2, denoted by x and y respectively, are drawn from
a joint distribution h(x, y), with support [0,∞)× [0,∞). The demand of firm 1, x, is given by
the marginal distribution f(x) =
∫∞
0
h(x, y)dy. Similarly, the demand of firm 2, y, is given by
g(y). In the following analysis, I focus on the case where demands (x, y) follow an exponential
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distribution with λ = 1,8 but in Appendix E I show that the main results carry through in the
linear case. More particularly, the exponential distribution can be described as follows. The
marginal distributions F (x) and G(y) and marginal densities f(x) and g(y) are respectively
F (x) =1− e−x,
G(y) =1− e−y,
f(x) =e−x,
g(y) =e−y.
The joint distribution function H(x, y) and joint density function h(x, y) follow Gumbel (1960):
H(x, y) =(1− e−x)(1− e−y)(1 + αe−x−y),
h(x, y) =e−x−y[1 + α(2e−x − 1)(2e−y − 1)],
where −1 < α < 1 is a measure of correlation.9
We consider the following game:1011
• Stage 1: firm 1 and 2 invest in their own local capacity L1 and L2 simultaneously;
• Stage 2: the provider(s) invest(s) in capacity of flexible resources K;
• Stage 3: the provider(s) set(s) a per unit price of flexible resource p;
• Stage 4: demands (x, y) are realized and firms decides whether and how much to buy the
flexible resource.
It is clear that in Stage 4, if a firm’s demand spikes above its local capacity, it will purchase
flexible resources as long as the price is less than pi. In other words, a firm’s demand for flexible
resources is price-inelastic.12
For simplicity, I make the following assumptions. First, pi > cL, so there is incentive to
purchase local resources. Second, I focus on the more interesting case where cK < cL. For
example, it is common in practice that cloud computing exhibits significant economies of scale.
To facilitate our analysis, I focus on the specification with pi = 1, cL = 0.5 and cK ∈ [0, 0.5].13
8A distribution is exponential when F (λ, x) = 1− λe−λx is satisfied.
9Strictly speaking, ρ = cov(x,y)√
var(x)var(y)
is the coefficient of correlation, but since α and ρ move in the same
direction (more precisely, ρ = α4 , see Equation (3.10) on p. 706 of Gumbel (1960)), there is no loss of generality
in saying that α is a measure of correlation.
10I do not model entry here, but I expect the same qualitative result with entry. Although entry will lower
the price, the underinvestment problem still exists as long as p > cK .
11Section 6.1 considers alternative timing.
12Qualitative results for the monopoly case would be similar if we consider elastic demand. As for the duopoly
case, however, if we consider elastic demand, we can no longer follow the approach of de Frutos and Fabra (2011),
who study a sequential capacity-price game under demand uncertainty with price-inelastic demands. Interested
reader can see Reynolds and Wilson (2000) for a discussion of the two-stage game under the assumption of
downward-sloping and uncertain demand.
13These assumptions are innocuous for two reasons. First, setting pi = 1 is only a normalization, and it
will not affect the qualitative conclusion. Second, the main results hold more generally as long as the flexible
resource is more efficient, i.e. cK < cL.
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Third, when users are indifferent between buying and not buying the flexible resource, it will
always buy for some exogenous reasons such as reputation: if its customer’s demand is not
served, the customer will never purchase from that firm again. The solution concept adopted
here is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
3 Social Optimum
The benevolent planner chooses L1, L2, K so as to maximize social welfare. Fig. 1 illustrates
the basic structure of the demand for flexible resources.
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Figure 1: Demand for Flexible Resources.
In Area ∅, both firms have sufficient local capacity to serve their customers, and therefore
there is no demand for cloud. Area I1 captures the situation where firm 2’s local capacity is
enough to cover its demand, but firm 1’s demand exceeds its local capacity and will therefore
purchase flexible resources. Area I2 illustrates the reverse situation where only firm 2 buys
cloud. In Area II, both firms buy cloud. In all the cases above, all demands are served. Area
III represents the situation where firm 1 has enough local capacity, while firm 2 has too much
demand such that the flexible resource provider is capacity constrained. Area IV shows the
reverse situation: firm 1 has too much demand, while firm 2’s local capacity is sufficient. Area
V captures the situation where the demands of both firms are extremely high such that it
exhausts the capacity of the flexible resource provider. Thus the social welfare is given by
max
L1,L2,K
S =
∫
∅+I1+I2+II
(x+ y)h(x, y)dydx+
∫
III
(x+ L2 +K)h(x, y)dydx
+
∫
IV
(L1 +K + y)h(x, y)dydx+ (L1 + L2 +K)
∫
V
h(x, y)dydx
− cKK − cL(L1 + L2). (1)
Let Ω(L1, L2, K) denote the probability of (x, y) falling in areas {III}+ {IV }+ {V }. The
social planner only invests in flexible resources, and the socially optimal investment is given by
Ω(0, 0, K) = 1−
∫ K
0
∫ K−x
0
h(x, y)dydx = cK .
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The optimal capacity is such that the social marginal benefit equals the marginal cost.
Proposition 1. The social planner only invests in the flexible resource, and the socially optimal
investment in flexible resource increases with demand correlation if cK is small, but decreases
with demand correlation if cK approaches cL.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 runs as follows. The social planner only invests in flex-
ible resources because cK < cL. As the demand correlation increases, so does the probability
of getting either high demand realizations or low demand realizations from both firms: the
firms either “win big” or “lose big.” The impact of an increase in demand correlation there-
fore depends on the cost of the flexible resource. If the investment cost is sufficiently low,
then “losing” is cheap and the planner would focus on reaping the benefits of high demand
realizations. Therefore, investment increases with correlation for low cost. On the contrary,
if investment cost is large enough, the planner aims at minimizing the risk of “losing,” so
investment decreases with correlation.
4 Monopoly
Suppose now that there is a monopoly provider for the flexible resource that chooses p and
K to maximize its expected profit. Proceeding by backward induction, given L1, L2, K and
monopoly price pm, the demand for cloud is the same as in Fig. 1 as long as pm ≤ pi. As the
monopolist can extract all the value of its cloud service, it is obvious that
pm = pi (2)
in Stage 3.
The investment of the provider is determined by
Ω(L1, L2, K) = 1−
∫ L
0
∫ L+K
0
h(x, y)dydx+
∫ L+K
L
∫ 2L+K−x
0
h(x, y)dydx = cK , (3)
In Stage 1, expecting that pm = pi, firm 1 chooses its local capacity L1 so as to maximize
its profit:
max
L1
∫ L1
0
xf(x)dx+
∫ ∞
L1
L1f(x)dx− cLL1.14
The first two terms show that the whole demand is served when demand is below local capacity,
whereas capacity is saturated when demand exceeds local capacity. The last term represents
the total spending in local capacity.
Then, the first-order condition determines the equilibrium investment of L1:
1− F (L1) ≤ cL. (4)
14The firm only gets positive profit from its local capacity because the surplus of the consumers, who are
served by utilizing the flexible resource, are extracted entirely.
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The second-order condition is also satisfied.
Analogously, for firm 2, the equilibrium investment of L2 is determined by
1−G(L2) ≤ cL. (5)
The market equilibrium is characterized by Equations (2), (3), (4) and (5). It is clear that,
unlike the social optimum, firms invest in a positive amount of local capacities; and unlike the
duopoly case, firms’ investments are independent of the provider’s investment strategy.
Proposition 2. In the market with a monopolistic flexible resource provider, the provider
underinvests in the flexible resource relative to the social optimum, while the firms overinvest
in their local capacity.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. The monopolist sells the flexible resource
at a monopoly price, which extracts all consumer surplus. Anticipating this, the firm will
invest in L, even if L is a less efficient technology compared with K, in order to gain part
of the consumer surplus. As a consequence, the benefit of investing in the flexible resource is
lower for the monopolist than for the social planner, and hence the monopolist underinvests.15
To solve the problem, the regulator may ban local investments of the firms. However, this is
a rather heavy-handed approach. Firms may prefer local computing for a variety of legitimate
reasons. For instance, flexible resources are valuable for the firm as they offer the flexibility
to modify a prior investment strategy as more information becomes available over time. More
particularly, in case of “good news” the firm can scale up their services, and in case of “bad
news” it can scale down. Therefore, firms are willing to pay extra to buy the flexible resource
even though it is more expensive (pm > cL). Indeed, statistics shows that cloud computing is
appealing to industries that have high variability in data traffic such as medical research and
drug discovery in the healthcare sector.16
Therefore, I consider a lighter form of intervention. Since surplus appropriation originates
from market power, it seems reasonable to investigate whether introducing more competition
in the market—thereby forcing down the price—would incentivize the provider and the firms
to behave optimally. As we will see later, the extent to which competition improves investment
incentives is subtler than it appears as it varies with demand correlation and investment cost.
Let us now turn to the impact of correlation.
Proposition 3. In the decentralized case with a single provider, there is positive local invest-
ment; and the monopolist’s investment in flexible resource increases with demand correlation
if cK is small, but decreases with demand correlation if cK approaches cL.
Proof. See Appendix C.
15Notice that Proposition 2 holds more generally for any rationing rule. The reason is that users pay the
monopoly price, and hence the rationing rule will not affect local investment.
16World Economic Forum (2010) identifies the healthcare industry as one of the major sectors which can
benefit from cloud computing.
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The impact of an increase in demand correlation on both socially optimal and equilibrium
investment depends on whether the flexible resource is significantly more efficient than the
local resource. The intuition of Proposition 3 is in the same spirit as Proposition 1. However,
the monopolist’s investment is more likely to be decreasing in demand correlation as shown in
the following corollary:
Corollary 1. The smallest cK under which investment in flexible resource decreases with de-
mand correlation is larger at the social optimum than under monopoly.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The intuition behind Corollary 1 is that local investment is zero at the social optimum and
positive in the monopoly case. Thus, the planner will not run into the risk of not being able to
sell the flexible resource to firms that receive low demand and buy local resources only. As a
consequence, the planner can better enjoy the possible windfall from high demand realizations
than the monopolist.
5 Duopoly
Let us now consider the case of competing providers. They play the game as before.17 I solve
the problem proceeding backwards. In the capacity-price stage, I apply some results in de
Frutos and Fabra (2011), henceforth FF, which can be summarized as follows. In their paper,
two firms make sequential capacity-price decision under demand uncertainty in markets with
price-inelastic demands. They show that
• Proposition 7 of FF. The only equilibrium in the pricing stage is a mixed-strategy equi-
librium.
• Proposition 8 of FF. Capacity choices are asymmetric.
• Proposition 9 of FF. If the density function of demand is non-decreasing, then the equi-
librium is unique.
For a given L1 and L2, there is a stochastic demand function for the flexible resource that is
price-inelastic. Thus, we can apply FF’s results in the continuation game, where the aggregate
capacity is defined by K(L1, L2), the capacity chosen by the smaller provider k
−(L1, L2), the
capacity chosen by the larger provider k+(L1, L2), and the equilibrium expected profits of the
two providers pi−(L1, L2) and pi+(L1, L2).
The main difference between this paper and FF is that the first stage in this paper is
absent in FF. FF assume that demand is exogenously given, while here the demand for the
17Since there is demand uncertainty, this exercise requires more than just applying the classical result of
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), which proves outcome equivalence between the capacity-price game and the
Cournot game. As pointed out by de Frutos and Fabra (2011), the introduction of demand uncertainty rules
out the existence of symmetric equilibria due to a difference in marginal revenue between the large firm and
the small firm even if the two firms are symmetric ex ante.
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flexible resource is endogenously determined by investments in local capacity and the strength
of demand correlation. Therefore, unlike the monopoly case, firms’ investments are no longer
independent of the provider’s strategy. This poses several difficulties in the analysis.
First, the endogenously determined demand function for the flexible resource is not neces-
sarily non-decreasing, which means that the equilibrium in the continuation game may not be
unique. If this is the case, we focus on the most symmetric case, where the difference between
the big firm and the smaller firm is minimized, meaning that the degree of competitiveness is
maximized.
Second, this introduces strategic interaction between the two firms: each firm’s investment
changes the demand for the flexible resource, which affects providers’ investments and in turn
affects the rival firm’s investment. To simplify the analysis, I assume that L1 and L2 are chosen
cooperatively such that L1 = L2 = L. The two firms maximize the following joint profit:
1819
max
L
[
S(L)− pi+(L)− pi−(L)]− 2cLL,
where S(L) is the social surplus given by Equation (1). The surplus is shared between the
firms and the providers (but not the consumers). This is because demand is inelastic, so firms
can extract all consumer surplus.
Solving the above problem yields the equilibrium investment in local capacity Ld1 and L
d
2,
where d denotes duopoly. Then, we can also determine the equilibrium investment in flexible
resource Kd(Ld1, L
d
2).
As should be expected, competition always increases social welfare as compared to the
monopoly case because it mitigates the underinvestment problem in flexible resources and the
overinvestment problem in local resources. A formal proof is provided in Appendix F. More
interesting is that the extent of improvement depends crucially on the cost of capacity and the
degree of correlation, which is shown in the following numerical example.20
Fig. 2 plots, for a given cK , flexible resource investment against demand correlation. Social
optimum is shown with a solid line, the duopoly case is drawn as a dotted line, and the
monopoly case is illustrated by a long-dashed line.
The main observations in Fig. 2 are summarized in the following remark.
Remark 1. Comparing the socially optimal, monopoly and duopoly solutions,
(i) When cK is sufficiently small, both the planner and the monopolist’s investments in flex-
ible resources increase with correlation. As cK approaches cL, both of these investments
decrease with correlation. The threshold level such that the impact of correlation changes
is larger at the social optimum than it is under monopoly.
18Under this assumption, rationing rule does not affect investments in local and flexible resources.
19Even though I assume cooperative investment, the two firms act differently from the case with a single firm
because the two firms cannot share their local capacity.
20The main difficulty in solving for an explicit solution in the duopoly case stems from the fact that the
demand for the flexible resource is endogenously determined by L and α, and this, in turn, affects the mixed
strategy in prices of the provider. Consequently, it is difficult to characterize the profit function of the firm
without using a numerical method.
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Figure 2: Flexible Resource Investment and Demand Correlation for different values of cK .
(ii) Under duopoly, it can be shown that for high or low correlations, the investment in flexible
resource is increasing in correlation.
Part (i) is already shown in Propositions 1 and 3, and Corollary 1. As for part (ii), the
intuitive reason for not observing a negative relationship between investment and correlation
under duopoly, unlike the socially optimal and monopoly regimes, is as follows. Under the
socially optimal and monopoly regimes, local investment does not vary with correlation: at
the social optimum local investment is zero; in the monopoly case firms pay the monopoly
price, and thus their local investment is not affected by correlation. Unlike these regimes, in
the duopoly case firms pay less than the monopoly price and are therefore more willing to
switch to buying the flexible resource in order to capture the possible windfall of high demand
realizations. As a consequence, firms invest less in local capacities, and hence providers invest
more in flexible resources as correlation increases.
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6 Discussion
6.1 Alternative Timing
My analysis focuses on the timing where firms invest first. It fits the scenario where some flex-
ible resources such as cloud computing offers more flexibility in managing demand uncertainty
than local resources. However, one could alternatively consider the case where firms observe
the provider’s investment in flexible resources before deciding their own local investment. In
this setting, firms still overinvest in L, and providers still underinvest in K, provided price is
chosen after the capacity decision because the monopoly price will emerge as long as demand
is inelastic. Another alternative is to consider the case where p is chosen prior to L, but the
underinvestment problem will still occur because the provider will never charge p = cK as its
profit will become zero and it will not have any incentive to invest. Moreover, it is difficult to
think of a situation in practice that fits the scenario of choosing price prior to capacity.
6.2 Remedies
Although it is always more efficient for firms to use the flexible resource, there are two reasons
that prevent everyone from using the flexible resource only: first, the stochastic nature of
demand prevents the provider from contracting over the amount of investment ex ante; second,
the provider of the flexible resource cannot commit to marginal-cost pricing. As a consequence,
firms rely more on local capacity and the provider underinvests.
Throughout the paper, I focus on non-contingent and linear pricing.21 One can think of
other pricing structures such as non-linear tariffs and contingent pricing. First, considering
non-linear tariffs, it is common for cloud providers such as Amazon, Dropbox and Google to
use non-linear pricing for their storage service: they provide basic service for free, and then
offer additional storage capacity for a fee. However, we can easily see that non-linear pricing
does not solve the underinvestment problem because the provider will underinvest as long as
p > cK .
Second, considering contingent pricing, such practice is not very popular in the market for
cloud computing: with the exception of AWS, which uses both contingent and non-contingent
pricing, other large cloud providers such as Azure, Google and IBM rarely use spot pricing.
On the contrary, in the electricity wholesale market, electricity is bought and sold at spot
prices.22 Yet, there is only one kind of capacity: firms typically buy energy from electricity
companies, but do not generate their own electricity (although some firms may have their
own emergency electricity generator, they are not for regular use). As argued by Carr (2005)
and Jeff Bezos in Stone (2013), they both envisioned today’s IT supply would transform from
21Non-contingent pricing means that prices are determined before demand is realized, whereas contingent
pricing are state-dependent.
22The electricity literature (see, for instance, Borenstein and Holland (2005), Murphy and Smeers (2005),
Joskow and Tirole (2007), and Le´autier (2011)) mostly considers a two-stage game, in which firms choose their
capacity first, and then they bid prices for each state of the world in a spot market. See also Crew, Fernando
and Kleindorfer (1995) for a survey of the literature on peak-load pricing.
12
companies’ private capacity into a centralized utility service, just like how electricity became
a utility a century ago. It is therefore interesting to think about how spot pricing can change
investment incentives in an environment with both flexible and local resources, as in the case
of cloud computing, where firms buy flexible resource for its instant scalability and own local
resource for data security and privacy reasons. A formal model of contingent pricing would
entail a trade-off as follows: the provider tends to price high during peak periods, which induces
firms to invest more in local capacity; but it tends to price low during off-peak periods, which
induces firms to rely more on flexible resource. Consequently, the extent to which investment is
distorted depends on the relative strength of these two effects. If, for instance, the second effect
dominates, then contingent pricing can potentially remedy the problem of underinvestment in
flexible resources. Despite this additional trade-off created by contingent pricing, investment
decision still depends fundamentally on the degree of correlation and the cost of capacity, and
therefore all the main qualitative results of this paper should remain valid.
Finally, it may be worthwhile to consider a subsidy. Suppose the regulator introduce a
subsidy s for investment in flexible resource. The cost of flexible resource becomes cK − s, so
the provider will be more willing to offer a lower price. At the same time, it also has more
incentives to undertake investment in flexible resource, which could potentially mitigate the
underinvestment problem.
6.3 Policy Implications
Cloud computing has emerged as a new business model for computing and storage resource
management for firms, and a new source of entertainment and communication services for
consumers. As the cloud market is still in its infancy, many classic economic issues such as
pricing, investment strategies, the appropriate market structure, competition policy, privacy
and security concerns are still unclear.23 We take the first step to understand the impact of
competition on investment in this industry.
Although there are a number of competitors in the cloud computing market such as AWS,
23Recently, there has been a flurry of research on the opportunities and obstacles for the adoption of cloud
services; see, for example, Armbrust et al. (2009), Harms and Yamartino (2010), and Marston et al. (2011).
They mainly focus on three layers of the cloud architecture: infrastructure, platform, and application. However,
as argued in Bayrak et al. (2011), such categorization are useful only in defining technological differences, but
not so much in analyzing their economic impact. Indeed the existing literature on cloud computing are mostly
descriptive, and only rarely is the problem approached from a theoretical perspective. Fershtman and Gandal
(2012) raise important economic issues of cloud computing such as changes in the strength of network effects,
compatibility among software applications, the development of standards, and the market structure that should
emerge. However, most of these topics have already been well-documented in a separate literature; in order
to work on theoretical advancement, one needs to clearly delineate the unique features of the cloud computing
market.
Recent efforts to expand the theoretical study of cloud computing include Wang (2014), who studies the
adoption of cloud services within a moral hazard framework, and this paper. However, they differ in two
respects. First, this paper is about capacity investment, while Wang focuses on the problem of migration,
which means that there is no investment on the provider’s side. Second, this paper studies the effect of
competition, but such effect is absent in Wang.
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Azure, Google and IBM/SoftLayer, market power exists. For instance, large cloud providers
build hyperscale datacenters that exhibit significant increasing returns to scale, which could
come from the centralization of computing resources or from volume discount on the compo-
nents that providers use to build their datacenter.24 As a result, smaller firms may not be
able to compete with these incumbents. Moreover, many consumers prefer to buy service from
well-known brands because they expect higher quality. This raises concerns about the degree
of competitiveness of this market.
This model predicts that the impact of competition on investment depends crucially on
the investment cost. It is often argued that cloud computing reduces the cost of investing in
computing power significantly. While the marginal cost of producing an extra unit of storage
or computing power is close to zero, the costs of electricity for powering up the machines,
cooling the systems, as well as management, maintenance and implementation of the software
and hardware in a large server farm is far from negligible.25 Therefore, information on the cost
structure in the cloud computing industry should have been gathered and analyzed as it has
important consequences for investment.
7 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources. I find that
market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment, and competi-
tion always improves social welfare. The extent of improvement depends on demand correlation
and investment cost. If investment cost is small, investment under social optimum, monopoly
and competition is increasing in correlation; if cost is large, investment under competition is
still increasing in correlation, whereas that under social optimum and monopoly goes in oppo-
site direction. I have also examined the potential merits of policies such as spot pricing and a
subsidy for investment in flexible resource to remedy the underinvestment problem.
These results have implications for investment decision in outsourcing, particularly in the
market for cloud computing. Admittedly, the cloud computing market is growing unpre-
dictably, and there is no clear indication or consensus on how it will develop. For now, this
paper shows that even if the cloud computing market follows the footsteps of the electricity
market and providers eventually adopt spot pricing, a similar trade-off that we derived here
will arise. Therefore, analyzing data on cost and demand represents a useful first step towards
a fuller understanding of the nascent industry.
I list some important topics that lie beyond the scope of this paper, but would be appropriate
for further work. The first is to consider product differentiation. For example, assuming
that cloud computing services (such as Dropbox storage services) and local storage services
are differentiated—how, then, would the investment strategy change? Second, it would be
interesting to study the consequences of vertical integration. For instance, what will happen
if upstream cloud computing firms such as Microsoft and Google also enter the downstream
24See Harms and Yamartino (2010) for more examples of how firms benefit from economies of scale.
25In September 2012, the New York Times reported that “the digital warehouses use about 30 billion watts
of electricity, roughly equivalent to the output of 30 nuclear power plants.”
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market of software applications?
Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 1
The social optimum is obtained by differentiating Equation (1) with respect to L1, L2 and K.
The F.O.C. with respect to L1 is given by
{IV }+ {V } ≤ cL.
Similarly, the F.O.C. with respect to L2 is
{III}+ {V } ≤ cL.
Finally, the F.O.C. with respect to K is:
{III}+ {IV }+ {V } ≤ cK .
As {III}+ {IV }+ {V } > {IV }+ {V } or {III}+ {V }, the marginal benefit of investing
in the flexible resource is always higher than that of local capacity. Furthermore, the marginal
cost of investing in the flexible resource is lower (cK < cL). Then we must have L
∗
1 = L
∗
2 = 0,
where asterisk denotes the socially optimal level of investment. Since cK < cL < pi, all F.O.C.
are satisfied with equality.
The socially optimal investment in the flexible resource is determined by the F.O.C. with
respect to K, which can be rewritten as
F (K,α, cK) =
∫ K
0
∫ K−x
0
h(x, y)dydx− 1 + cK = 0.
By implicit function theorem,
∂K
∂α
= −
∂F
∂α
∂F
∂K
.
We can show that
∂F
∂K
=
∫ K
0
e−K [1 + α(2e−x − 1)(2ex−K − 1)]dx
is positive. Moreover, we have
∂F
∂α
=
∫ K
0
∫ K−x
0
e−x−y(2e−x − 1)(2e−y − 1)dydx
=− e−K [K + 3e−K + 2Ke−K − 3].
It can be shown that there exists a K¯∗ such that ∂F
∂α
< 0 when K > K¯∗, and ∂F
∂α
> 0 when
K < K¯∗. In addition, it is obvious that K decreases with cK . Therefore, if cK is small such
that K > K¯∗, then ∂K
∂α
> 0. On the contrary, if cK is large, K is small such that K < K¯
∗,
then ∂K
∂α
< 0.
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B Proof of Proposition 2
For firm 1, its equilibrium investment is determined by
1− F (L1) = cL,
As 1− F (L1) > {IV }+ {V }, we must have Lm1 > L∗1 = 0, and hence there is overinvestment.
The same happens for firm 2.
For the flexible resource provider, its equilibrium investment Km is determined by
max
K
Π =
∫ L1
0
∫ L2+K
L2
(y − L2)h(x, y)dydx+
∫ L1+K
L1
∫ L2
0
(x− L1)h(x, y)dydx
+
∫ L1+K
L1
∫ L1+L2+K−x
L2
(x+ y − L1 − L2)h(x, y)dydx
+K
[∫ L1
0
∫ ∞
L2+K
h(x, y)dydx+
∫ ∞
L1+K
∫ L2
0
h(x, y)dydx
+
∫ ∞
L1
∫ ∞
L2
h(x, y)dydx−
∫ L1+K
L1
∫ L1+L2+K−x
L2
h(x, y)dydx
]
− cKK.
which gives us
Ω(Lm1 , L
m
2 , K
m) = cK = Ω(0, 0, K
∗).
Suppose that the flexible resource provider invests K such that Lm + K = K∗, Since
Lm > 0, it must be Ω(Lm1 , L
m
2 , K) < Ω(0, 0, K
∗), which means such K cannot be the equilibrium.
Therefore, the flexible resource provider must invest Km such that Lm+Km < K∗, which means
that Km < K∗ (underinvestment).
C Proof of Proposition 3
The monopolist’s investment is determined by
F (K,α, cK) =
∫ L
0
∫ L+K
0
h(x, y)dydx+
∫ L+K
L
∫ 2L+K−x
0
h(x, y)dydx− 1 + cK = 0.
By implicit function theorem,
∂K
∂α
= −
∂F
∂α
∂F
∂K
.
It is straightforward to show that
∂F
∂K
=
∫ L
0
e−x−L−K [1 + α(2e−x − 1)(2e−L−K − 1)]dx
+
∫ L
0
e−y−L−K [1 + α(2e−y − 1)(2e−L−K − 1)]dy
+
∫ L+K
L
e−2L−K [1 + α(2e−x − 1)(2e−x−2L−K − 1)]dy > 0,
∂F
∂α
=
∫ L
0
∫ L+K
0
e−x−y(2e−x − 1)(2e−y − 1)dydx
+
∫ L+K
L
∫ 2L+K−x
0
e−x−y(2e−x − 1)(2e−y − 1)dydx.
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Similar to the proof in Appendix A, there exists K¯m such that ∂F
∂α
< 0 when K > K¯m; and
∂F
∂α
> 0 when K < K¯m. Moreover, as Km is decreasing in cK , then if cK is small such that
K > K¯m, then ∂K
∂α
> 0. On the contrary, if cK is such that K < K¯
m, then ∂K
∂α
< 0.
D Proof of Corollary 1
From the proof in Appendices A and C, it suffices to show ∂F
∂α
∗
(K∗) < ∂F
∂α
m
(Lm, Km), where
both terms integrate the same function over the respective area as shown in Fig. 3. The
difference between ∂F
∂α
∗
(K∗) and ∂F
∂α
m
(Lm, Km) lies in the shaded area. Comparing integrations
over the triangles and the trapezium, we can conclude that the above condition is satisfied
because the triangles have higher values of x or y.
y
x
Lm+Km
K*
Lm+Km K*
Figure 3: Investment under Social Optimum and Monopoly.
We therefore have
• If ∂F
∂α
m
< 0, then ∂F
∂α
∗
< 0. Both ∂K
∂α
∗
, ∂K
∂α
m
> 0, which is true for small cK .
• If ∂F
∂α
∗
> 0, then ∂F
∂α
m
> 0. Both ∂K
∂α
∗
, ∂K
∂α
m
< 0, which is true for large cK .
• For medium cK , ∂F∂α
∗
< 0 and ∂F
∂α
m
> 0. Then, ∂K
∂α
∗
> 0 and ∂K
∂α
m
< 0.
Thus, under social optimum there is a larger range of cK under which investment increases
with correlation as compared to the monopoly case.
E Linear Example
E.1 Social Optimum
The relationship between investment in flexible resource and demand correlation at the social
optimum is slightly different when demands are uniformly distributed. To see this, consider a
joint distribution h(x, y) as follows:
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• Positive correlation. With probability ρ, only pairs of demands on the x = y line are
possible (perfect positive correlation). With probability 1 − ρ, demands are uniformly
distributed on a unit square [0, 1] × [0, 1] (independent demands). We can use ρ as a
measure of positive correlation.
• Negative correlation. With probability ρ, only pairs of demands on the x+ y = 1 line are
possible (perfect negative correlation). With probability 1 − ρ, demands are uniformly
spread over a unit square [0, 1] × [0, 1] (independent demands). We can use −ρ as a
measure of negative correlation.
Since cK < cL < pi, all the F.O.C. are satisfied with equality. In the case of positive
correlation, the optimal capacity is chosen such that the marginal benefit is equal to the
marginal cost:
ρ(1− K
2
) + (1− ρ)1
2
(2−K)2 = cK .
Note that K ≥ 1 because cK ≤ 0.5. Differentiating K with respect to ρ, we find that K∗
increases with ρ.
In the case of negative correlation, we have
K∗ = max
{
1, 2−
√
2cK
1− ρ
}
.
Note that K ≥ 1. The reason is that if demands are perfectly negatively correlated and
investment is less than 1, then marginal benefit always exceeds cost. When K > 1, the optimal
investment is determined by
(1− ρ)1
2
(2−K)2 = cK .
It is easy to see that K∗ increases with −ρ.
We therefore have
Result 1. In the case of uniformly distributed demands, the social planner only invests in the
flexible resource, and the socially optimal investment always increases with demand correlation.
The reason is that, for uniformly distributed demands, the marginal benefit of expanding
capacity always increases as correlation increases.
E.2 Monopoly Case
In the monopoly case, the result in the linear example is the same as Proposition 3 in the main
text. To keep things simple, further assume that cK ∈ [0.25, 0.5] such that L1 +K and L2 +K
are smaller than 1. In the case of positive correlation, the monopolist chooses K such that
ρ(
1
2
− K
2
) + (1− ρ)(3
4
−K − 1
2
K2) = cK .
In the case of negative correlation, the monopolist choice of K solves
ρ(1− 2K) + (1− ρ)(3
4
−K − 1
2
K2) = cK .
We therefore have
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Result 2. In the case of uniformly distributed demands, there is positive local investment;
and the monopolist’s investment in flexible resource increases with demand correlation if cK is
small, but decreases with demand correlation if cK approaches cL.
F Competition Improves Social Welfare
Competition always increases social welfare because it mitigates the underinvestment and over-
investment problem.
• Kd ≥ Km: The F.O.C. of K in the monopoly case is
{III}+ {IV }+ {V } = cK .
As for the duopoly case, we refer to Equation (12) in FF: the F.O.C. of K is
1−D(K) = cK ,
where D(K) is the demand for the flexible resource. Since firms only buy the flexible
resource when demand is above their local capacity, this condition can be rewritten as
{III}+ {IV }+ {V }
1− ∫ L1
0
∫ L2
0
h(x, y)dydx
= cK .
Therefore, Kd ≥ Km because 1 − ∫ L1
0
∫ L2
0
h(x, y)dydx < 1. Note that Kd = Km only
when L1, L2 = 0.
• pd ≤ pm: Under duopoly, providers of the flexible resource randomize over price with the
upper bound of pi (see Proposition 7 of FF).
• Ld ≤ Lm: Firms invest less in local resource under duopoly because the price of it is
lower.
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